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The Better Way to Stop Delay:  
Analyzing Speedy Sentencing Claims 
in the Wake of Betterman v. Montana 
 
In Betterman v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right terminates after a defendant’s 
conviction. In dicta, the Court suggested that a defendant might pursue 
a constitutional claim of undue sentencing delay under the Due Process 
Clause. Lower courts have generally embraced this suggestion. Still, the 
Betterman Court’s limited holding left certain questions open: What 
analytical framework is appropriate to address due process claims of 
delay between conviction and sentencing? And if a court finds that 
sentencing was unduly delayed, what is the proper relief?  
After Betterman, some courts have analyzed postconviction delay 
using Barker v. Wingo’s four factors: length of delay, reason for delay, 
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Other 
courts have used United States v. Lovasco’s two-prong test: the 
defendant must demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice and the 
government delayed in bad faith. This Note advocates for adopting the 
more flexible balancing test established by Barker but argues that 
Barker’s traditional remedy for undue delay (dismissal of charges) is 
inappropriate in the sentencing context. Instead, this Note proposes a 
default remedy in which a defendant’s sentence is reduced by the amount 
of delay if a speedy sentencing violation is proven. 
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INTRODUCTION  
On April 19, 2012, Brandon Betterman pleaded guilty to bail 
jumping.1 The court ordered him to return to the local jail to await his 
sentencing hearing.2 And indeed, Betterman waited—it took fourteen 
months before he was sentenced.3  
 
 1. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Betterman v. Montana (Betterman II), 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016) 
(No. 14-1457). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
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After his sentencing, Betterman appealed, asserting that the 
delay between his conviction and sentencing violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial.4 At the time, state and federal 
courts disagreed as to whether the speedy trial right applied at the 
sentencing phase.5 Unfortunately for Betterman, the Montana 
Supreme Court held that the right does not extend after conviction.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Betterman 
v. Montana to resolve the split.7 The Court agreed with Montana, 
holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause ceases to 
apply after a defendant’s conviction or guilty plea.8 The Court 
emphasized that the only relief available for a Speedy Trial Clause 
violation—automatic dismissal of a defendant’s charges—would be 
inappropriate for undue sentencing delay.9 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, suggested in 
dicta that a defendant might nevertheless be afforded constitutional 
relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.10 The vast majority of courts addressing postconviction 
delay after Betterman have accordingly employed some form of due 
process analysis.11 Yet, because Betterman only presented a Speedy 
Trial Clause question, the Court’s limited holding did not conclude 
which framework would apply to constitutional claims alleging 
postconviction delay12 or what the proper relief would be for delayed 
sentencing.13  
 
 4. State v. Betterman (Betterman I), 342 P.3d 971, 972 (Mont. 2015); see U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial . . . .”). 
 5. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 & n.1 (acknowledging a court split).  
 6. Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 978. 
 7. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 1615.  
 10. See id. at 1612 (“For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause 
does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, 
tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also 
Figueroa v. Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J. June 23, 2016) 
(recognizing as dicta the Betterman Court’s suggestion that relief might be sought via a due process 
claim). 
 11. See infra notes 167–172 and accompanying text (summarizing and collecting 
postconviction-delay cases after Betterman).  
 12. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We have never decided 
whether the Due Process Clause creates an entitlement to a reasonably prompt sentencing 
hearing. Today’s opinion leaves us free to decide the proper analytical framework to analyze such 
claims if and when the issue is properly before us.”); id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting 
the question of the “appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause challenge . . . is an open one”). 
 13. The Court was clear that automatic dismissal was an inappropriate remedy; however, the 
majority did not propose an alternative remedy. See id. at 1615 (majority opinion) (noting that the 
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Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence—and implicitly the majority 
opinion as well14—proposed analyzing undue sentencing delay under 
the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, which contemplates 
“the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant” when scrutinizing 
delays between a defendant’s arrest or charge and trial.15 After 
Betterman, several courts have applied Barker to Due Process Clause 
claims of postconviction delay.16 Other courts,17 however, have looked 
to United States v. Lovasco, which provides a strict two-prong test to 
analyze Due Process Clause claims of precharge delay—the court must 
consider if the reason for delay violates “fundamental conceptions of 
justice,” and the defendant must show actual prejudice as a result of 
the delay.18 Today, courts are generally split over whether the Barker 
factors or the Lovasco test should apply to delayed sentencing claims.19 
This Note addresses the split by advocating for adoption of the Barker 
factors to analyze sentencing delay but with a modified remedy scheme 
that is more appropriate for sentencing than dismissal of the 
defendant’s charges, which Barker traditionally requires.  
Part I provides background on the criminal prosecution process 
and describes why sentencing delay is troubling.20 Part II then explores 
how the pre-Betterman split mirrors the post-Betterman divide over 
Barker versus Lovasco—courts that applied the Speedy Trial Clause 
used Barker, while courts that rejected the Speedy Trial Clause often 
 
“sole remedy” for a Speedy Trial Clause violation is dismissal of charges and that dismissal would 
be an unjustified windfall for a speedy sentencing violation). 
 14. See infra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (explaining how Justice Ginsburg listed 
in a footnote the four factors from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as reasonable 
considerations for sentencing delay but did not explicitly cite or endorse Barker by name); see also 
Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12 (suggesting in a footnote that courts could consider the 
“length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing, 
and prejudice”). 
 15. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30; 
see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971) (explaining that the speedy trial right 
attaches upon arrest or charge, but not before). 
 16. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.  
 17. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.  
 18. See 431 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1977) (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not 
sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the due process inquiry must consider the 
reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”); id. at 790–91 (“It requires no 
extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from ‘fundamental conceptions of 
justice’ when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused 
is guilty.”); see also infra Section II.B.2 (analyzing how courts have employed the Lovasco factors).  
 19. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(f) (4th ed. 2015 & Supp. 
2017–2018) (noting that some courts following Betterman have employed the Barker factors while 
others have used Lovasco).  
 20. See infra Part I.  
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employed a Lovasco due process analysis.21 Accordingly, courts’ pre-
Betterman rationale is particularly salient to understanding the 
current division between these two approaches. Part III discusses the 
merits and disadvantages of the Barker and Lovasco frameworks and 
their respective remedies, and it considers how each framework’s 
original purpose applies to postconviction delay. In Part IV, this Note 
proposes that the Barker factors be used to analyze sentencing delay 
due process claims. While the Barker test should be adopted, courts 
should adopt a less aggressive remedy. Specifically, this Note advocates 
that courts should, as a default, reduce a defendant’s sentence by the 
amount of delay if a speedy sentencing violation is proven.  
I. A CAUSE FOR CONCERN: WHY UNDUE DELAY IN  
SENTENCING MATTERS 
Sentencing delays happen for a number of reasons, and 
defendants’ protections against undue delay vary in each phase of their 
criminal prosecution. Section I.A describes each phase and the 
corresponding protections against delay. It also explains why bifurcated 
proceedings are outside the scope of the sentencing proceedings to 
which Betterman and this Note pertain. Section I.B explores why delay 
is detrimental to both defendants’ and society’s interests. 
A. Protections Against Delay in Criminal Prosecutions 
As Betterman succinctly explains, criminal prosecutions unfold 
in three phases.22 In each phase, the suspect or defendant has at least 
some protection against delay.23 In the first phase, the government 
decides whether a suspect should be arrested and charged.24 The 
Supreme Court held in Lovasco that the Due Process Clause provides 
suspects with constitutional protection against undue prosecutorial 
delay.25 Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process 
Clauses provide that individuals shall not be deprived of “life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”26 If a defendant’s due process 
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016).  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 795 & n.17 (1977) (explaining that the 
Due Process Clause protects against “oppressive delay,” which the defendant can demonstrate by 
proving actual prejudice that resulted from unreasonable delay by the prosecutor); see also 
Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Lovasco).  
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (pertaining to the federal government, providing that “[n]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 
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rights are violated, the court should try to “counteract any resulting 
prejudice” proven by the defendant.27 
Second, once the suspect is arrested or charged, he must be tried 
as a criminal defendant or strike a plea deal with the prosecutor; during 
this phase, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.28 
As the Supreme Court explained in Barker,29 the Sixth Amendment’s 
Speedy Trial Clause protects defendants from delay between arrest or 
charge and trial.30 If a court finds a Speedy Trial Clause violation, the 
defendant’s charges must be dismissed.31 The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that dismissal is an “unsatisfactorily severe remedy,”32 
but the Court has nevertheless upheld this remedy because the speedy 
trial right is unique.33 Unlike other Sixth Amendment trial guarantees, 
a new trial would not cure a Speedy Trial Clause violation, because it 
would not negate—in fact, it would only worsen—the emotional stress 
and postponed rehabilitation associated with trial delays.34  
Third, the defendant’s conviction concludes the trial phase, and 
the defendant enters the sentencing phase.35 In the federal system, the 
average time elapsed between conviction and sentencing is just over 
 
(applying due process to the states, prohibiting them from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”).  
 27. Burkett v. Cunningham (Burkett I), 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 28. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (“Once charged, the suspect stands accused but is 
presumed innocent until conviction upon trial or guilty plea.”). 
 29. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972) (“[A] speedy trial is guaranteed the accused 
by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . .”); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
321 (1971) (holding that the speedy trial right commences upon arrest or charge). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial.”); see Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613–14 (first citing Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 532–33; and then citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 320) (explaining that the Speedy Trial Clause 
protects the period from arrest or charge through conviction and protects defendants from the risks 
of delayed trial).  
 31. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 (“The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial 
right [is] dismissal of the charges . . . .” (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522)).  
 32. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.  
 33. See Strunk, 412 U.S. at 439–40 (explaining that the denial of the speedy trial right is 
unlike the denial of other Sixth Amendment guarantees and confirming that dismissal must 
remain the only remedy for a speedy trial violation).  
 34. See id. at 439 (describing how denying the Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury 
or public trial, for example, could be remedied by a new trial but the same is not true of the speedy 
trial right). 
 35. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (holding that the speedy trial right “detaches upon 
conviction, when this second stage ends”). A defendant’s conviction may be by trial or by guilty 
plea. See id. (explaining that the presumption of innocence lasts “until conviction upon trial or 
guilty plea”).  
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three months.36 The defendant is often incarcerated during this time.37 
Much of the wait can be attributed to the creation of the presentence 
report, which is prepared by the probation office after the defendant’s 
conviction.38 The report includes detailed information about the 
defendant’s personal and criminal history, recommends an appropriate 
type and length of punishment, and may provide information needed to 
calculate restitution.39 In fashioning a sentence, the court may consider 
an array of information, including the presentence report, trial 
evidence, victim statements, defendant testimony, witness testimony, 
and other submissions by the defense and prosecution.40 In contrast to 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial, the burden of proof for 
the sentencing hearing is the lower preponderance of the evidence 
standard.41 
After conviction and during the sentencing phase, the defendant 
is no longer presumed innocent.42 Consequently, Betterman held, the 
defendant does not enjoy a postconviction speedy trial right, because 
the Speedy Trial Clause only protects the accused.43 Still, defendants 
retain some protection against sentencing delay.44 Justice Ginsburg 
pointed out that defendants can often seek statutory relief under 
applicable federal or state rules of criminal procedure.45 Moreover, as 
prefaced earlier, the Betterman Court suggested that the Due Process 
 
 36. See id. at 1616 n.8 (citing the U.S. solicitor general’s claim that the “the median time 
between conviction and sentencing in 2014 was 99 days”). 
 37. See id. at 1617 n.9 (explaining that there is presumption against bail in this circumstance 
but that the sentencing court may credit the defendant with time served).  
 38. See id. at 1617–18, 1618 n.8. 
 39. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.5(b) (explaining that the report may include an 
interview with the defendant; include information about the defendant’s prior criminal record; 
state other information about the defendant, such as employment, education, family, finances, and 
medical history; state information about the victim; make recommendations regarding probation 
or imprisonment and any conditions that should be imposed; and, under a presumptive-sentencing 
system, respond to certain offense characteristics, such as providing information sufficient for the 
court to order restitution). The defendant may usually request correction of the report before it is 
finalized. See id. § 26.5(c) (observing that it used to be standard to keep the report from the 
defendant but that jurisdictions now more commonly disclose them). 
 40. Id. § 26.5(b).  
 41. See id. § 26.4(h) (“[T]he Court has upheld as consistent with due process a burden of proof 
for facts used in setting the sentence within the range authorized for the offense of conviction that 
is lower than the burden of proof applied when determining elements of an offense.”). 
 42. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 (explaining that conviction “terminates the presumption 
of innocence”).  
 43. Id. at 1614–15, 1618 (determining, based on Court precedent, history, and the text of the 
Speedy Trial Clause, that the speedy trial right only protects the accused and “does not extend 
beyond conviction”). 
 44. Id. at 1617.  
 45. Id. at 1617 & n.10 (asserting that “[t]he primary safeguard comes from statutes and rules” 
and collecting examples of state provisions similar to the federal rule); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
32(b)(1) (“The court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay.”). 
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Clause could provide a constitutional “backstop” to protect defendants 
against undue sentencing delay.46 
Although Betterman held that the speedy trial right terminates 
at the end of the trial phase,47 the Court reserved the question of 
“whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to bifurcated proceedings in 
which, at the sentencing stage, facts that could increase the prescribed 
sentencing range are determined.”48 Such bifurcated proceedings 
function more like part of a defendant’s trial than do sentencing 
proceedings after conviction.49 Importantly, facts that raise the 
sentencing range, except for the fact of a prior conviction, must be 
treated as elements of a greater offense and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.50 Because the standard of proof is higher for these sentence-
raising facts than for facts at a sentencing hearing,51 more factual 
development may be necessary. Relatedly, a court in a bifurcated 
proceeding cannot place as much reliance on the presentence report; 
while a sentencing court may credit information included in the 
presentence report, even hearsay,52 a sentence-raising fact cannot be 
 
 46. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617.  
 47. Id. at 1613 (holding that the speedy trial right “detaches upon conviction, when this 
second stage ends”).  
 48. Id. at 1613 n.2; see id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the question 
remained open).  
 49. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) (“Such a determination is part of the ‘trial’ 
that must precede the defendant’s conviction for the offense carrying the higher sentencing range; 
it is not part of sentencing for that conviction.”). Some criminal statutes provide that if certain 
facts are proved, the minimum or maximum sentence (or both) for that crime increases. See id. 
§ 26.4(i). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, the Court evaluated the 
limits on the legislature’s “ability to characterize certain facts as mere sentence factors rather than 
as elements of separate, aggravated offenses,” ultimately requiring that facts raising the 
sentencing range (besides a prior conviction) be treated as elements of a greater offense. LAFAVE 
ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Alleyne v. United States, 
570 U.S. 99 (2013); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224 (1998). Some trials with Apprendi facts are bifurcated into separate proceedings—one for 
the elements of the underlying crime and one for the Apprendi facts that determine the defendant’s 
sentencing range. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2 
(referring to bifurcated proceedings where, “at the sentencing stage, facts that could increase the 
prescribed sentencing range are determined”). For example, Justice Ginsburg highlighted capital 
cases, where a defendant is only eligible for the death penalty if certain aggravating factors are 
found beyond a reasonable doubt. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2; see LAFAVE ET AL., supra 
note 19, § 26.4(i) (explaining that any fact that raises the sentencing range is required to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 50. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616; Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99; 
Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224.  
 51. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(h) (explaining that the Court has accepted the 
lower preponderance of evidence standard of proof in sentencing proceedings, but when “a fact 
functions as an element of an aggravated offense, then the defendant has the right to demand 
proof of its existence beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury”). 
 52. See id. § 26.5(a) (describing the leniency of the evidentiary standard for sentencing 
hearings and acknowledging that the “[t]he sentencing court can consider other types of hearsay, 
whether contained in the presentence report or offered by the prosecution or defense”). 
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proven just by virtue of inclusion in the presentence report.53 It made 
sense for the Betterman Court to distinguish bifurcated proceedings in 
which facts raising the sentencing range are found—there is a 
convincing argument for applying the Speedy Trial Clause to such 
proceedings.54 Thus, when this Note hereinafter refers to sentencing 
delay or speedy sentencing claims, it refers to sentencing after 
conviction and excludes those unique bifurcated proceedings in which 
sentence-raising facts are found. 
B. Causes and Effects of Delay  
Both Lovasco and Barker contemplate the reasons for delay and 
the resulting prejudice suffered by the defendant.55 Under both 
frameworks, legitimate, nonprejudicial reasons for delay weigh in favor 
of the government—that is, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the charge.56 Reasons for delay that are generally found to be 
nonprejudicial include preparing the presentence report, calculating 
restitution, and conducting discovery concerning these tasks.57 If the 
defendant contributes to the delay—by requesting discovery to 
challenge the restitution, for example—the court may be less 
sympathetic to claims of undue delay.58 Conversely, understaffed 
government pretrial teams, full dockets, and strained judicial resources 
do not serve as valid reasons for delay.59 If these factors are present, 
 
 53. See id. § 26.4(i) (“[A] fact is not admitted merely because the defendant fails to object to 
its allegation in a presentence report.”).  
 54. See id. § 26.4(f) (“There is strong basis for applying the Speedy Trial Clause to a 
determination of a fact that must be treated as an element under the Apprendi line of cases.”). 
 55. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally 
a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the due process inquiry must 
consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”); Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (“Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such 
factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant.”).  
 56. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (describing reasons for delay that should be weighed against the 
government and those that might justify delay).  
 57. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to 
find undue delay when the probation office spent eight months preparing an extensive presentence 
report and calculating restitution and defendants subsequently made discovery motions regarding 
the loss calculation for restitution). 
 58. See, e.g., id. (finding no prejudice when defendants’ numerous discovery motions 
contributed to the delay and resulted in a reduction of the restitution calculation).  
 59. See Burkett v. Fulcomer (Burkett II), 951 F.2d 1431, 1433 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding 
violations of due process and the Sixth Amendment caused by “saturated dockets and the apparent 
strain on judicial resources” in the state court system); see also James, 712 F. App’x at 162 
(weighing “a crowded docket” and “court congestion” against the government). 
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however, they merely weigh against the government; they do not 
mandate a finding for the defendant.60  
Postconviction delay may negatively impact both the defendant 
and any victims.61 Sentencing generally provides closure and 
punishment following conviction, while delay prolongs resolution for 
both the victim and the defendant.62 For the defendant, particularly, 
this uncertainty can provoke anxiety or depression and accompanying 
physical ailments.63 For example, defendants have complained that 
they were unable to eat or sleep during delay, that their significant 
others ended their relationships due to the uncertainty of defendants’ 
ultimate incarceration, and that family members suffered ill effects as 
a result of delay.64  
Moreover, sentencing delay may keep defendants from 
participating in rehabilitative programs available at long-term 
correctional facilities,65 as defendants are generally held prior to 
sentencing in local jails with few services.66 The Court in Barker 
described local jails as “deplorable” and asserted that “[l]engthy 
exposure to these conditions ‘has a destructive effect on human 
character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much 
more difficult.’ ”67 For example, defendants are often unable to access 
drug or alcohol treatment, sex offender programs, and educational 
programs.68 Because some defendants awaiting sentencing have 
already been sentenced for other crimes, they may be unable to timely 
 
 60. See James, 712 F. App’x at 162 (noting these factors “weighed against” the government). 
 61. See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 524 (4th ed. 2011 & Supp. 2018) (“Delay in sentencing may leave the defendant, as well as the 
victim, in limbo concerning the consequences of conviction.”). 
 62. See id. (discussing various consequences of sentencing delays). 
 63. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (finding that uncontested evidence of Burkett’s 
anxiety and its effect on his wellbeing leaned slightly in Burkett’s favor in his claim of delay); 
Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Mont. 2015) (describing Betterman’s claims that he suffered 
from anxiety, depression, and accompanying physical ailments, such as stomach problems, while 
awaiting sentencing). 
 64. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (describing Burkett’s inability to eat or sleep 
and noting his claim that his fiancée broke off their engagement due to the uncertainty of the 
length of Burkett’s incarceration); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550, at 
*10 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (reporting defendant’s contention that he suffered from anxiety, that 
his fiancée left due to his indeterminate sentence, and that his mother fell ill as a result of the 
uncertain delay). 
 65. See WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 61, § 524 (“It postpones the commitment of the 
defendant to corrections facilities, [and] may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation . . . .”).  
 66. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3–7 (describing Betterman’s fourteen-month 
stint in county jail and the detrimental effects it caused). 
 67. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972). 
 68. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443 (restating Burkett’s claims that he had no access to 
alcohol and sex offender programs); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 973–74 (detailing how Betterman 
had no access to a mental-health assessment, counseling for chemical dependency, or education). 
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complete required programs under their first sentences, further 
compounding their problems.69 Finally, several defendants have 
pointed out that being held in jail precludes them from becoming 
potentially eligible for conditional release or expanded visitation 
privileges that correctional facilities may allow.70 
Delayed sentencing may also interrupt the rehabilitation of 
defendants out on bail during the period between their conviction and 
sentence.71 For example, one defendant was inadvertently not 
sentenced for fifteen years.72 In the interim, she had built a life for 
herself with a family and a job and had rehabilitated on her own.73 Her 
ultimate sentence, six months in a halfway house, threatened to set 
back her progress.74  
From a procedural standpoint, a delay in sentencing may also 
delay a defendant’s ability to appeal his sentence. Under the final 
judgment rule, an appeal generally cannot be filed until final judgment 
has issued.75 In a criminal case, the sentence represents the final 
judgment.76 As one defendant protested, the more time that passed 
before his sentence, the more difficult it would be to reconstruct his 
defense if needed after his appeal was decided.77  
Society also suffers costs of delay, as the Barker Court pointed 
out.78 First, failure to provide prompt sentencing is inefficient, as it 
creates a backlog in the court system.79 A crowded docket will inevitably 
lead publicly funded court staff, prosecutors, and public defenders to 
remain involved in cases for longer than otherwise necessary and to 
 
 69. See, e.g., Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 973 (describing Betterman’s complaints that a warrant 
had issued in another county because his sentencing delay inhibited him from completing portions 
of the sentence imposed by the other county).  
 70. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443 (crediting defendant’s argument that he would have 
had more liberal visitation rights in state prison than he had in county jail); Betterman I, 342 P.3d 
at 973 (noting defendant’s argument that he would have been eligible for conditional release if he 
was an inmate at the state Department of Corrections instead of the county jail). 
 71. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing a defendant who 
had been going about her life, unaware that her sentence was even pending).  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. at 201–02 (asserting that the defendant had been a successful, law-abiding citizen 
in the intervening fifteen years and that six months in a halfway house would destabilize her 
successful rehabilitation).  
 75. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940) (establishing the final 
judgment rule).  
 76. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal 
case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”).  
 77. Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1991).  
 78. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20 (1972) (listing concerns). Of course, Barker 
addresses preconviction delays, but many of its interests are applicable to the postconviction-
presentence context as well. See infra Section III.A.1.  
 79. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.  
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waste resources squabbling over scheduling.80 Additionally, it burdens 
local jail systems, as defendants awaiting sentencing crowd these 
facilities.81 As discussed above, delay also prevents defendants’ access 
to certain programs and services in corrective facilities that may not be 
available in local jails.82 Delaying access to these programs thwarts 
defendants’ rehabilitation,83 making it difficult for defendants to 
ultimately rejoin and contribute to society.  
Two points are clear from this exploration of the causes and 
effects of delay. First, there are both legitimate and nonlegitimate 
reasons for delay.84 Second, real harm can result from the failure to 
sentence a defendant promptly.85 Both society and, of course, the 
defendant may suffer as a result of this delay.  
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: CLAIMS OF DELAYED SENTENCING  
BEFORE AND AFTER BETTERMAN 
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Betterman, lower federal 
and state courts disagreed over how to analyze delay between 
conviction and sentencing.86 One view, which Betterman argued for, 
was that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial extended to 
sentencing.87 Other courts disagreed, taking the position—ultimately 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Betterman—that the speedy trial 
right terminates upon conviction.88 Courts that rejected a 
postconviction speedy trial right generally still allowed defendants to 
 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (describing the district 
court’s failure to promptly schedule sentencing and admonishing the government that it has a 
responsibility remind the court of “the unfinished business before it” in such lapses).  
 81. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520.  
 82. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 973, 977 (Mont. 2015) (noting Betterman was prevented 
from entering the correctional facility and unable to attend chemical-dependency counseling or a 
sex offender program that he was required to complete for a sentence in another county).  
 83. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520.  
 84. Compare United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that an 
extensive presentence report was justifiable), with Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he delay caused by the backlog of cases in Blair County cannot be classified as justifiable.”).  
 85. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (describing Burkett’s extreme anxiety awaiting 
sentencing, his inability to obtain rehabilitative services, and the loss of his fiancée due to the 
uncertainty of his sentence).  
 86. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016) (“We granted certiorari to resolve a split 
among courts over whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to such delay.” (citation omitted)). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 577 F.2d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The 
constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy trial applies to sentencing.” (citing Pollard v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957))).  
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is apparent that 
sentencing proceedings and trials are separate and distinct phases of criminal prosecutions. 
Accordingly, we hold that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which governs the 
timing of trials, does not apply to sentencing proceedings.”).  
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pursue a constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause,89 an 
approach the Betterman Court endorsed in dicta.90 By explicitly 
rejecting the contention that the Speedy Trial Clause applies to 
sentencing, the Supreme Court in Betterman resolved the controversy 
in one sense.91 Under Betterman’s limited holding, however, open 
questions remain: What analytical framework is appropriate to address 
constitutional claims of inordinate delay in sentencing?92 And if a court 
finds that sentencing was unduly delayed, what is the proper relief?93  
Justice Sotomayor explicitly advocated94 for analyzing 
sentencing delay under Barker, which established four factors to 
consider in analyzing Speedy Trial Clause violations.95 Lower courts, 
however, traditionally applied the Lovasco96 test to Due Process Clause 
claims of delay in the sentencing context, even though Lovasco 
concerned precharge delays.97 After Betterman, courts have split over 
whether to apply Barker or Lovasco in speedy sentencing claims under 
the Due Process Clause.98 To lay the foundation for this Note’s proposal, 
this Part examines the conflicting pre-Betterman approaches, the 
rationale of Betterman itself, and post-Betterman approaches. Lastly, 
this Part explores the various remedies that have been previously 
employed.  
 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 199 (“A delay in criminal proceedings that ‘violates those fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define 
the community’s sense of fair play and decency,’ can, depending on the circumstances, constitute 
a violation of the Due Process Clause.” (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 
(1977))). 
 90. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617–18 (asserting that defendants are not without a 
remedy and could seek relief under the Due Process Clause).  
 91. See id. at 1613 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial detaches after 
conviction).  
 92. See id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We have never decided whether the Due Process 
Clause creates an entitlement to a reasonably prompt sentencing hearing. Today’s opinion leaves 
us free to decide the proper analytical framework to analyze such claims if and when the issue is 
properly before us.”); see also id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the question of the 
“appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause challenge . . . is an open one”). 
 93. See supra note 13. 
 94. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explicitly proposing 
Barker factors); see also id. at 1618 n.12 (majority opinion) (listing the Barker factors without 
explicitly naming the case). 
 95. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 96. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
 97. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Lovasco to sentencing 
delay but acknowledging it was developed for the precharge context).  
 98. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) n.135.80 (noting that some courts following 
Betterman have employed the Barker factors while others have used Lovasco).  
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A. Pre-Betterman Approaches to Postconviction Delay 
Prior to Betterman, the Supreme Court only briefly addressed 
whether the sentencing phase of a trial could be examined under the 
Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. In the 1957 case Pollard v. 
United States, the Court simply stated: “We will assume arguendo that 
sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”99 
Subsequently, many courts—including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and at least 
seventeen state courts—explicitly held that the Sixth Amendment 
applied to delays between conviction and sentencing.100 Other courts, 
like the Pollard Court, avoided the question altogether—the First, 
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits and many states 
simply assumed that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to speedy 
sentencing claims but denied that undue delay had occurred in the 
cases before them.101 The Second Circuit and some states—including 
Montana102—disagreed, holding that the Speedy Trial Clause did not 
apply but that the Due Process Clause provided constitutional 
protection against delay.103 Finally, some courts that applied the 
Speedy Trial Clause also held that the Due Process Clause applied.104  
1. The Speedy Trial Clause and the Barker Factors 
Courts holding that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to 
sentencing delays regularly applied the Barker balancing test,105 which 
 
 99. 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).  
 100. See Kristin Saetveit, Note, Beyond Pollard: Applying the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial 
Right to Sentencing, 68 STAN. L. REV. 481, 491–93 (2016) (collecting cases applying the Speedy 
Trial Clause to sentencing proceedings); see also Jolly v. State, 189 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Ark. 2004) 
(noting that seventeen states recognized a speedy trial right to sentencing delays and collecting 
state cases), abrogated by Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).  
 101. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 493–94 (collecting cases).  
 102. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015) (rejecting application of the Speedy Trial 
Clause). 
 103. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 489–90, 494–95 (describing and collecting cases rejecting 
the Speedy Trial Clause in the sentencing context and noting that “[s]ome, but not all, of the courts 
prohibiting application of the speedy trial right to sentencing have instead located a right to 
prompt sentencing under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
 104. See id. at 495 n.101 (describing how some courts have analyzed delay under both 
constitutional provisions).  
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Danner, 429 F. App’x 915, 917–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the Speedy Trial Clause applied to postconviction claims of delay and applying the Barker factors 
to a claim of delayed sentencing); United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies from arrest through sentencing 
and applying the Barker factors to defendant’s claim of postconviction delay); United States v. 
Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that for Sixth Amendment claims of 
delay between trial and sentencing, “the majority of circuits, including this one,” use the Barker 
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considers four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, 
(3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the 
defendant.106 Specifically, Barker sought to address prejudice caused by 
“oppressive pretrial incarceration,” “anxiety and concern of the 
accused,” and fading memories or lost exculpatory evidence that could 
possibly weaken the defendant’s case.107 The defendant is not required 
to affirmatively prove actual prejudice to his case—the mere possibility 
is enough.108 Moreover, Barker’s factors are relatively flexible and 
should be considered with the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case.109 Courts applying these factors may also take note of the 
underlying concerns at play in Barker: decency and fairness; the 
societal interest in prompt and efficient adjudication; the potential for 
the defendant to commit other crimes or jump bail if he is not confined 
between conviction and sentencing; and any “detrimental effect on 
rehabilitation.”110  
While Barker involved delay between the defendant’s arrest and 
trial,111 some courts applied the Barker factors in the sentencing context 
as well.112 For example, in Burkett v. Cunningham, the Third Circuit 
held that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to the five-and-a-half-year 
postconviction delay before Wayne Burkett’s sentencing, and it 
 
test, though declining to apply Barker to a similar claim under the Due Process Clause); United 
States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Sixth Amendment to claims of 
delayed resentencing and using the Barker factors); United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 
167 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the “constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial applies to 
sentencing” and that “[w]e review sentencing delays under Barker v. Wingo”); Burkett I, 826 F.2d 
1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding explicitly that the Speedy Trial Clause applies through the 
sentencing phase and that the Barker factors should be applied to analyze the claim); Jolly, 189 
S.W.3d at 45 (“[W]e conclude that the right to a speedy sentence is encompassed within the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial. We therefore turn to an application of the factors enunciated 
in Barker v. Wingo . . . to determine whether Jolly was denied his right to a speedy sentencing in 
this case.” (footnote omitted)).  
 106. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  
 107. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  
 108. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (identifying an interest in limiting “the possibility” of an 
impaired defense and noting that “[l]oss of memory . . . is not always reflected in the record because 
what has been forgotten can rarely be shown”).  
 109. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he factors set forth in Barker 
are guidelines, not rigid tests. . . . [A]ll four factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case.”). 
 110. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20. 
 111. See id. at 533 (describing the right to a speedy trial and detriments resulting from delay 
between arrest and trial, which was extraordinary in Barker’s case). Barker waited over five years 
after his arrest for his murder trial to begin—the prosecution wanted to convict the other suspect 
accused of the murder first, then obtain his testimony against Barker. Id. at 516–19.  
 112. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.  
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considered his claim under Barker.113 The court implied that Barker 
provided an appropriate analysis of the circumstances causing delay, 
which was necessary to determine if the delay in Burkett’s case was 
undue.114 Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that the trial court acted 
within its discretion in finding that all Barker factors weighed in favor 
of Burkett.115 The court emphasized the length of the delay (over five 
years) and its detrimental effect on Burkett, who suffered anxiety as a 
result of his indeterminate sentencing.116 In fashioning relief for 
Burkett, the court noted that the “normal remedy” for a Speedy Trial 
Clause violation is dismissal,117 and in light of the egregiousness of the 
violation, “no remedy short of discharge can vindicate Burkett’s right to 
speedy trial.”118 Accordingly, the Third Circuit ordered the lower court 
to discharge Burkett’s convictions.119 
2. The Due Process Clause and the Lovasco Test 
In the pre-Betterman era, some courts declined to apply the 
Speedy Trial Clause to sentencing but found that due process provided 
defendants with an avenue for constitutional relief.120 These courts 
applied the Lovasco121 test to determine whether defendants’ due 
process rights were violated.122 Lovasco requires that courts consider 
both (1) the reason for the delay and (2) the prejudice to the accused.123 
 
 113. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1211, 1220, 1223–24 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the Speedy 
Trial Clause applies to sentencing and that Burkett’s claim of undue sentencing delay could be 
properly considered under Barker).  
 114. See id. at 1219 (describing the application of Barker). But see Saetveit, supra note 100, at 
491 (suggesting that the Burkett court’s reasoning for accepting the Speedy Trial Clause in this 
context was sparse).  
 115. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1224.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973)); see also Strunk, 412 U.S. at 
440 (holding that for a Speedy Trial Clause violation, “dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, 
‘the only possible remedy’ ” (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972))).  
 118. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1224–25.  
 119. Id. at 1226.  
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the Speedy 
Trial Clause did not apply to sentencing but explaining that the Due Process Clause could protect 
defendant against undue delay); Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015) (rejecting application 
of the Speedy Trial Clause to sentencing delay but holding that Betterman’s “interest in being 
sentenced without unreasonable delay is ‘protected primarily by the Due Process Clause’ ” (quoting 
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982))). 
 121. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).  
 122. See, e.g., Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (holding Lovasco is the appropriate standard to analyze 
due process violations at the sentencing phase); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 979 (same). 
 123. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; see id. (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not 
sufficient element of a due process claim.”); see also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (noting that prejudice 
alone is not enough to examine due process and that the reason for the delay must be balanced 
against the prejudice imposed). 
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Lower courts have interpreted the first prong of Lovasco to require proof 
that the government delayed in bad faith, even if the defendant can 
show some prejudice.124 Under the second prong of this test, speculative 
claims of prejudice are not enough—the defendant must demonstrate 
actual prejudice.125  
Although the Lovasco test was originally conceived to analyze 
suspects’ due process rights against delay before arrest or charge, some 
courts found it applied to the posttrial context as well.126 United States 
v. Ray exemplifies the application of Lovasco to a Due Process Clause 
claim for speedy sentencing.127 In late 1991, Shenna Ray pleaded guilty 
to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, but she was not ultimately 
sentenced until early 2008, over sixteen years later.128 After her plea, 
Ray was originally sentenced to one year of incarceration, which she 
appealed.129 While her appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued a 
separate decision that required reexamination of Ray’s sentence, so the 
case was remanded to the district court.130 The court, however, 
inadvertently failed to reschedule Ray’s sentencing.131 Ray, who had 
been released on bail pending her appeal, assumed the matter was 
settled and moved on—she started a family, worked, attended school, 
and paid taxes.132 Sixteen years later, the court discovered the issue and 
scheduled Ray to be sentenced.133 Acknowledging that the long delay 
was troubling and commending Ray’s considerable rehabilitation, the 
government recommended that she be sentenced to probation and home 
detention.134 Instead, the court sentenced Ray to one day in prison and 
 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding no due 
process violation under Lovasco when defendant did not provide affirmative evidence of bad faith 
by the government). 
 125. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325–26 (1971) (explaining that the defendants 
did not demonstrate actual prejudice and that the due process claims are thus “speculative and 
premature”); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (rejecting Betterman’s due process claim as 
“speculative” and concluding that Betterman’s prejudice was “not substantial and demonstrable,” 
even though it involved unacceptable institutional delay). 
 126. Sanders, 452 F.3d at 580; see also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (noting that although Lovasco 
pertains to pretrial delay, it is “equally applicable” to sentencing). 
 127. See Ray, 578 F.3d at 199–202 (explaining the rationale for using Lovasco and applying 
the same to the case).  
 128. Id. at 186–87.  
 129. Id. at 187. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. at 187–88 (describing how Ray sought documentation of her criminal record from 
the court and that it became apparent that she was never resentenced and never served her 
original sentence).  
 134. See id. at 188–89 (explaining that the government took responsibility for the delay and 
recommended defense counsel’s proposed sentence). 
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three years of supervised release, with the first six months in a halfway 
house.135 This last provision was most troublesome, because it 
prevented Ray from working and caring for her youngest child.136 Ray 
appealed under the Speedy Trial Clause and the Due Process Clause, 
seeking to have her conviction vacated and sentence dismissed.137 
The Second Circuit rejected her speedy trial claim, taking issue 
with the fact that a Speedy Trial Clause violation requires dismissal of 
all charges.138 The court reasoned that long postconviction delays do not 
invoke the same anxiety as preconviction delays, nor do postconviction 
delays affect the defendant’s ability to defend herself.139 Nevertheless, 
the Second Circuit concluded, the Due Process Clause provides some 
protection against “oppressive delay” in sentencing, noting such delays 
violate due process notions of fairness and decency.140 The court found 
that Lovasco offered an appropriate analysis, because the primary 
consideration after conviction—similar to precharge—is oppressive 
delay.141 The court reasoned that considerations of prejudice and 
nonlegitimate reasons for delay must each be evaluated “in light of each 
other and the surrounding circumstances,” such that even substantial 
prejudice could be outweighed by a legitimate reason for the delay.142  
Ultimately, the court found that the government’s negligence 
caused the delay and that Ray did not have a duty to seek out 
sentencing.143 Moreover, the prejudice to Ray would be significant, as 
time in a halfway house would disrupt her successful rehabilitation.144 
The court explained that an appropriate remedy would instead 
counteract any prejudice caused by the violation of Ray’s rights.145 
Accordingly, it suspended the remainder of her sentence but 
 
 135. Id. at 189.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 186.  
 138. See id. at 193–94, 199 (noting that dismissal, as mandated by Strunk, was an inapposite 
remedy and denying that the Speedy Trial Clause applied). 
 139. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 490 (summarizing the Ray court’s lengthy reasoning, 
including the theory that the anxiety that defendants suffer from public accusation before trial is 
unlike the postconviction experience).  
 140. Ray, 578 F.3d at 199.  
 141. See id. (“The directive set forth in Rule 32, taken together with the general prohibition of 
‘oppressive delay’ established by the Due Process Clause, protects criminal defendants from 
unreasonable delays between conviction and sentencing.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977))).  
 142. Id. at 199–200.  
 143. See id. at 200 (noting that the government acknowledged its responsibility for the delay 
and that so long as Ray sought to have her sentence reconsidered rather than vacated, she did not 
bear responsibility for seeking out sentencing).  
 144. Id. at 201–02.  
 145. Id. at 202.  
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emphasized that not every sentencing delay would necessarily warrant 
such drastic relief.146  
Betterman did not fare so well when the Montana Supreme 
Court similarly rejected his Speedy Trial Clause claim but considered 
his claim of delay under the Due Process Clause.147 The court explained 
that, as to the Due Process Clause claim, both the reason and prejudice 
prongs of Lovasco were necessary to establish a violation: even if a 
defendant demonstrated “actual and substantial prejudice,” no remedy 
was warranted if there was a “legitimate reason” for the delay.148 The 
court attributed the majority of the fourteen-month sentencing delay to 
the state, because preparing the presentence report and scheduling the 
sentencing hearing took “an inordinate amount of time” through no 
fault of Betterman’s.149 Nevertheless, the court rejected Betterman’s 
claim—even after noting Betterman suffered an “unacceptable delay”—
because his claims of prejudice were too “speculative.”150  
3. Dual Application of the Speedy Trial Clause and  
the Due Process Clause 
Some courts have held that both the Speedy Trial Clause and 
the Due Process Clause are applicable to sentencing delay; these courts 
have proceeded to conflate the analyses for the two clauses.151 For 
example, in Burkett, the Third Circuit held that the Speedy Trial Clause 
applied to Burkett’s five-and-a-half-year sentencing delay.152 
Additionally, the court asserted that the Due Process Clause applied to 
any delay attendant to conviction, including sentencing delays.153 
Interestingly, the court analyzed the potential Due Process Clause and 
Speedy Trial Clause violations together,154 asserting that both clauses 
constrained postverdict delay and that the Barker factors should 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015). 
 148. Id. at 979 (quoting United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988)).  
 149. Id. at 980.  
 150. See id. at 980–81 (finding Betterman’s anticipated access to Department of Corrections 
rehabilitative services was too speculative).  
 151. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 n.101; see Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221–22 (3d Cir. 
1987) (asserting that the Due Process and Speedy Trial Clauses both “constrain post-verdict delay” 
and using the Barker factors to “inform” the due process analysis). 
 152. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1220.  
 153. See id. at 1221 (“The Due Process clause . . . protects not only against delays in trial, 
including sentencing; it also guarantees a reasonably speedy appeal . . . .”). In Burkett, the court 
was particularly concerned that the delay in sentencing had hindered Burkett’s ability to seek 
appeal. See id. at 1225 (“Burkett has been prejudiced by the monumental delay he has encountered 
in his attempts to secure his appeal as of right.”). 
 154. Id. at 1222.  
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“inform [the] due process determination.”155 Of course, the analysis for 
Speedy Trial Clause and Due Process Clause violations are not wholly 
dissimilar. Indeed, the Barker and Lovasco tests both consider the 
reason for delay and prejudice to the defendant.156 
B. Post-Betterman Approaches to Postconviction Delay 
In 2015, the Betterman Court definitively held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause was inapplicable to sentencing 
delays.157 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, reasoned that 
protection under the Speedy Trial Clause only applies before the 
defendant is convicted or pleads guilty and is thus still presumed 
innocent.158 She pointed to the history and text of the Speedy Trial 
Clause as support: the Sixth Amendment refers only to the “accused,” 
who were traditionally treated differently than those already tried and 
convicted.159 In dicta, the Court suggested that the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could still provide relief to 
defendants complaining of undue delay between conviction and 
sentencing.160 But Justice Ginsburg did not apply this analysis, as the 
petitioner did not pursue a due process claim before the Court.161  
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the 
question of the “appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause 
challenge . . . is an open one.”162 Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor 
proposed that the Barker factors, though traditionally used to analyze 
Speedy Trial Clause violations, could provide the proper framework for 
a due process analysis.163 Moreover, while Justice Ginsburg asserted 
that the “primary safeguard comes from statutes and rules,”164 she 
suggested that courts analyzing a constitutional claim of sentencing 
 
 155. See id. (explaining that sentencing served as a gatekeeping function to seeking an appeal 
and thus implicated Burkett’s due process rights by delaying his ability to appeal); see also 
Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 n.101 (stating that Burkett conflates the two standards).  
 156. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (focusing on prejudice to defendant 
and reason for delay); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (considering the length of the 
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant).  
 157. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016).  
 158. Id. at 1614.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 1612.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See id. at 1617 & n.10 (majority opinion) (referencing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(b)(1) and collecting examples of state provisions similar to the federal rule); see also FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(b)(1) (“The court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay.”).  
Grimsdale_Galley (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019  3:13 PM 
2019] THE BETTER WAY TO STOP DELAY 1051 
delay could consider the “length of and reasons for delay, the 
defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing, and 
prejudice.”165 These are the same four Barker factors that Justice 
Sotomayor proposed, but Justice Ginsburg did not cite Barker or 
explicitly endorse its application.166  
While Betterman did not explicitly recognize a constitutional 
right to speedy sentencing, courts have been cognizant of Betterman’s 
dicta regarding the application of the Due Process Clause.167 To date, 
only the Second and Third Circuits have ruled on a defendant’s 
constitutional right to speedy sentencing following Betterman. Both 
courts analyzed the defendants’ claims under the Due Process Clause, 
but they disagreed on whether to apply Barker or Lovasco.168 Federal 
district courts and state courts have also failed to agree on the 
appropriate speedy sentencing analysis.169 Generally, they have 
 
 165. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617–18, 1618 n.12.  
 166. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: “Speedy Trial” Guarantee Does Not Apply to Sentencing, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May 19, 2016, 8:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-
speedy-trial-guarantee-does-not-apply-to-sentencing [https://perma.cc/7NJ5-KQNN].  
 167. See Neathery v. Rader, No. 13-658-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 30, 
2016) (“There is no precedent from the United States Supreme Court specifically holding that the 
Constitution guarantees a right to speedy sentencing. . . . Nevertheless, this Court is cognizant of 
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Betterman . . . .”). 
 168. Compare United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–26 (2d Cir. 2018) (analyzing delay 
between appeal and resentencing under the Lovasco factors: reason for delay and prejudice to 
accused), and United States v. Brown, 709 F. App’x 103, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (analyzing delay 
between defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing under the Due Process Clause and employing 
Lovasco to find no violation), with United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(employing the Barker factors to find that a fourteen-month delay between conviction and 
sentencing did not violate due process when that time was used for the probation office to 
determine the full amount of restitution owed and for the defendant to seek discovery).  
 169. After Betterman, several courts have used the Barker factors to analyze claims of 
sentencing delay. Some have held, implicitly or explicitly, that Barker provides the proper analysis 
for postconviction due process claims. See United States v. Phillips, No. 1:15-cr-104, 2017 WL 
3129135, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2017) (asserting, pursuant to circuit precedent, that “[a]fter a 
defendant is found guilty, or a guilty plea has been entered, any alleged undue delays are assessed 
under the Barker due process analysis”); Deck v. Steele, 249 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1079–82 (E.D. Mo. 
2017) (using the Barker factors as the framework for a due process analysis of petitioner’s claim of 
delayed sentencing in his capital case); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550, 
at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (holding that Barker is the appropriate test to apply to defendant’s 
due process claim of unreasonable sentencing delay).  
 Others have rejected a constitutional right to speedy sentencing or have declined to 
characterize defendants’ claims as due process claims yet have nevertheless relied on Barker to 
analyze a claim of delayed sentencing. See Arnett v. Paramo, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 
WL 4325576, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (citing Betterman for the proposition that petitioner 
had “no constitutional right to a speedy sentencing hearing” but nevertheless citing Barker in 
finding that the delay was not prejudicial to the point of violating petitioner’s constitutional rights 
in part because he did not object to the continuance of both his trial and sentencing), adopted, No. 
EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL 4325586 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (mem.); Li v. State, No. 
70100, 2017 WL 1215890, at *2 (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017) (relying on the Barker factors without 
explicitly mentioning the Due Process Clause to find no speedy sentencing violation).  
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utilized some form of a due process analysis but have not agreed on 
whether to apply the Barker factors,170 as Justice Sotomayor 
recommended.171 In many ways, this divide now mirrors the prior split 
between courts applying the Barker factors under the Speedy Trial 
Clause and those using a Due Process Clause Lovasco analysis.172  
 
 Several courts have relied on the two prongs of the Lovasco test to analyze Due Process Clause 
claims of delayed sentencing. See United States v. Evans, No. 15-16 ADM/LIB, 2017 WL 1047254, 
at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2017) (naming reasons for delay and prejudice to the defendant as the 
primary considerations for a due process claim); Neathery, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (declining to 
endorse Justice Sotomayor’s proposal to use Barker to analyze speedy sentencing violations but 
considering the reason for defendant’s sentencing delay and any resulting prejudice in finding no 
due process violation); State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 232–33 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (asserting that 
the Lovasco test is “most suitable” to analyze sentencing delays under the Due Process Clause).  
 Other courts have either declined to endorse or rejected a specific test but have nevertheless 
decided claims of delayed sentencing under the Due Process Clause; these courts generally rely on 
notions of fundamental fairness. See Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400 JLS (JMA), 2018 WL 4405418, 
at *127 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (asserting that even after Betterman, the California Supreme 
Court could decline to apply the Speedy Trial Clause to bifurcated proceedings and holding that 
under the Due Process Clause, the capital petitioner failed to prove that sentencing delay caused 
the penalty phase of his trial to be “fundamentally unfair”); United States v. Lymon, Nos. 15-CR-
4302MCA, 15-CR-4082MCA, 2016 WL 9488764, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 9, 2016) (relying on Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1) and a due process right to a fundamentally fair sentencing 
proceeding to determine that vacating a sentencing hearing would cause unnecessary and unfair 
delay, respectively); Figueroa v. Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J. 
June 23, 2016) (applying neither Lovasco nor Barker explicitly but finding defendant’s due process 
rights had not been violated, because he was not prejudiced by the delay in his sentencing); People 
v. Dalby, No. C078421, 2018 WL 316442, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018) (noting that 
“[d]iminished due process rights arguably protect against fundamental unfairness in sentencing 
and resentencing” but implicitly declining to adopt the Barker test, instead simply finding no 
prejudice); People v. Wiseman, 413 P.3d 233, 241–42, 242 n.10, 244 (Colo. App. 2017) (explicitly 
rejecting the Barker test to analyze delay in sentencing and instead applying a “shock the 
conscience” standard to Wiseman’s due process claim regarding delayed resentencing).  
 Finally, a few courts have simply held that there is no constitutional right to speedy sentencing 
under Betterman. See Johnson v. Lester, No. CV-17-90-BU-BMM, 2018 WL 934605, at *1 (D. Mont. 
Feb. 16, 2018) (holding that under Betterman, “[n]o due process claim for unreasonable sentencing 
delay clearly exists under federal law at this time”); Stevens v. McTighe, No. CV-18-01-BU-BMM, 
2018 WL 747846, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (same); State v. D.S., No. 16-0693, 2017 WL 
5509925, at *7–8 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that defendant had no right to a speedy 
sentencing hearing under Betterman and that, while sentencing should be imposed without 
unreasonable delay, the delay in this case was not oppressive or purposeful). 
 170. See Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233 (noting that at least one federal district court has adopted the 
Barker factors following Betterman while other jurisdictions have adhered to the Lovasco 
framework). 
 171. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1619 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 172. See id. at 1613 n.1 (majority opinion) (collecting cases split on whether Speedy Trial 
Clause applied to sentencing); see also, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 
2006) (rejecting Barker and analyzing undue delay in sentencing under the Lovasco framework for 
due process); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the Barker factors to 
a Speedy Trial Clause analysis of undue delay in sentencing).  
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1. Applying the Barker Factors to Due Process Claims 
After Betterman, the Third Circuit has continued to apply the 
Barker factors to sentencing, now solely under the Due Process 
Clause.173 For example, in United States v. James, two defendants were 
convicted of crimes related to their tax fraud scheme.174 After the trial, 
the government sought to calculate and prove the total loss stemming 
from the defendants’ scheme, which delayed the presentence report.175 
One defendant challenged the calculation and sought related discovery, 
further postponing the sentencing hearing.176 Attorney scheduling 
conflicts and the district judge’s illness caused another two-month 
delay.177 Ultimately, the defendants waited fourteen months for 
sentencing.178 
The Third Circuit noted that Betterman’s holding did not 
preclude the application of the Barker test to due process claims, which 
was consistent with circuit precedent.179 As discussed in Section II.A.3, 
the Third Circuit had previously justified applying Barker to due 
process claims on the basis that both the Speedy Trial and Due Process 
Clauses protect defendants against undue postconviction delay.180 
Thus, it reasoned, the Clauses could be analyzed under the same test.181 
In James, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it might need to revisit 
its speedy sentencing jurisprudence in light of Betterman.182 
Nevertheless, the court declined to set out a new standard and instead 
applied the Barker factors to the defendants’ Due Process Clause 
claims.183  
Ultimately, the Third Circuit denied the defendants’ speedy 
sentencing claim under a Barker due process analysis.184 The court 
acknowledged that fourteen months was an undesirably long wait 
 
 173. See James, 712 F. App’x at 161–62 (employing the Barker factors to analyze a due process 
claim regarding a sentencing delay).  
 174. Id. at 156–57.  
 175. Id. at 156.  
 176. Id. at 156–57, 162.  
 177. Id. at 162.  
 178. Id.  
 179. See id. at 161–62 (citing Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219–21 (3d Cir. 1987)) (noting that 
Burkett had previously addressed claims of undue delay in sentencing under both the Speedy Trial 
Clause, now precluded in this context, and the Due Process Clause).  
 180. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222 (“Because both the Due Process and Speedy Trial clauses 
constrain post-verdict delay, the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have looked to the four Barker 
factors as a means of determining whether due process has been violated.”). 
 181. See id. (“[T]he Barker factors should also inform our due process determination.”). 
 182. James, 712 F. App’x at 161–62.  
 183. Id. at 162.  
 184. Id. at 163.  
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under Barker’s first factor.185 But it found that the reasons for delay—
Barker’s second factor—were nondeliberate and justified, as the delay 
was attributable to defendants’ discovery requests, the complexity of 
calculating restitution, the judge’s illness, and scheduling conflicts.186 
Under Barker’s third factor—assertion of right—the Third Circuit 
found that the defendants did not demand their right to speedy 
sentencing for over a year.187 Lastly, the court was not convinced that 
defendants demonstrated prejudice, Barker’s fourth factor.188 The 
defendants asserted that their confinement in a local jail—where they 
consumed a poor diet, had no law library, and suffered anxiety—was 
prejudicial.189 The James court acknowledged that confinement in a 
local jail pending sentencing could be prejudicial but held that this was 
not enough, on its own, to tip the scales in the defendants’ favor, 
particularly when the defendants received “substantial benefits” from 
the delay.190  
2. Utilizing the Lovasco Test 
Post-Betterman, the Second Circuit has continued to analyze 
speedy sentencing claims under the Due Process Clause, applying the 
Lovasco test consistent with circuit precedent.191 In United States v. 
Cain, the defendant waited five years for sentencing after his case was 
remanded to the district court.192 The court described how Cain’s 
requests for an attorney and resentencing were ignored, chastising the 
government and district court for demonstrating a “dismaying 
disregard for Cain’s right to a timely resentencing.”193 But despite 
attributing nearly all responsibility for the delay to the government and 
district court, the court concluded that Cain could not demonstrate the 
 
 185. Id. at 162.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 163. 
 189. Id.  
 190. See id. (noting that defendants were able to successfully contest certain restitution 
calculations for a reduction).  
 191. See United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray and applying 
Lovasco to defendant’s due process claim of delayed sentencing); United States v. Brown, 709 F. 
App’x 103, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (denying, in summary order, defendant’s due process claim under 
Ray); United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Lovasco to a due process 
analysis of delay in sentencing). 
 192. 734 F. App’x at 25.  
 193. See id. (asserting that the trial court and the government must not “leave a defendant in 
limbo, uncounseled, uncertain whether he will be retried, and without any indication of when, if 
ever, his arguments for a more lenient sentence after the dismissal of some of the most serious 
charges against him will be heard”).  
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necessary prejudice.194 His claims were too “speculative”—for example, 
Cain could not assert much more than the possibility of being released 
sooner.195  
Some district courts and state courts have similarly applied the 
Lovasco test to alleged sentencing delays.196 In State v. Lopez, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals found that Lovasco was better suited to 
delayed sentencing due process claims than Barker because Barker 
might not translate well to the postconviction context.197 The Lopez 
court noted that due process is satisfied when a defendant receives 
“adequate procedure to redress an improper deprivation of liberty.”198 
Lovasco, the court explained, appropriately limits the court’s inquiry to 
whether the procedure violated the community’s “fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of civil and political 
institutions, and which define the community’s sense of fair play and 
decency.”199 Arguably, the court in Lopez implied that Barker is not well 
suited to the due process arena, because Barker considers more than 
merely whether appropriate procedural protections were employed.200  
The Lopez court emphasized that regardless of the test, the 
burden of demonstrating prejudice—a necessary but not sufficient 
element of a due process claim—fell on the defendant.201 Ultimately, the 
court rejected the defendant’s claim because he did not meet this 
burden.202 Although the defendant waited 209 days between his 
conviction and sentencing, the reasons for delay included preparation 
of the presentence report, the judge’s medical leave, and the defendant’s 
request for delay to “get his affairs in order.”203 Because the defendant 
did not demonstrate significant prejudice, the court held that vacating 
the sentence would result in an unjustified windfall.204 
 
 194. Id. at 26. 
 195. Id.  
 196. See cases cited supra note 169.  
 197. State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017).  
 198. See id. (“However, as recognized in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the Barker factors ‘may 
not necessarily translate to the delayed sentencing context.’ Instead, ‘[t]he Due Process Clause can 
be satisfied where a [s]tate has adequate procedure to redress an improper deprivation of liberty 
or property.’ ” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 
1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring))).  
 199. Id. (quoting United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 2006)).  
 200. See id. (explaining that Barker may not translate well to due process claims, as due 
process only requires adequate procedure).  
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 234 (citing Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016)).  
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C. Remedies for Finding Undue Delay in Sentencing 
Courts that find a speedy sentencing violation may impose 
various remedies.205 In Burkett, the Third Circuit held that the 
egregious five-and-a-half-year delay in Burkett’s sentencing could not 
warrant any remedy other than dismissal.206 The court was clear that 
Burkett was a unique case with extreme facts: the length of delay was 
“monumental” and inexcusable, his right to review on appeal had been 
impaired, and the state court had continued to blatantly ignore federal 
orders to sentence him promptly—even the assistant district attorney 
for the county acknowledged that dismissal was appropriate given the 
circumstances.207 
Burkett later appealed to the Third Circuit again in a separate 
proceeding, complaining of a twenty-nine-month sentencing delay 
arising from a trial and conviction unrelated to that discussed above.208 
The court acknowledged that he was harmed by the amount of time he 
spent in local jails without rehabilitative support and by the anxiety 
resulting from the uncertainty about his sentence and isolation from his 
family and friends.209 Accordingly, the court reduced Burkett’s sentence 
by the amount of time that he had spent in local jail awaiting his 
sentencing after conviction (twenty-nine months).210 It distinguished 
this case from Burkett’s prior vacated sentence by explaining that in 
the previous case, the state court repeatedly flouted federal instructions 
to sentence him.211 
Other courts have found that suspending the remainder of a 
sentence may be appropriate.212 In Ray, for example, the Second Circuit 
 
 205. Cf. Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
“[t]he appropriate remedy for a proven due process violation often depends on the stage at which 
the violation is found and the relief sought” and noting that damages for a violation that has 
already occurred might prompt consideration of how the outcome would have changed with the 
required process, but when “injunctive relief is sought, courts simply have ordered the responsible 
government entity to provide an opportunity for process going forward”). 
 206. Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1226 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 207. See id. at 1225–26 (“Under the unusual circumstances of this case, including the ongoing 
violation of the federal court order and Blair County’s concession as to the appropriate remedy, it 
appears that no relief short of discharge could fully remedy these violations.”).  
 208. Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1436–37 (3d Cir. 1991); see id. at 1449 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(describing Burkett’s third arrest and set of charges to which this appeal pertained). 
 209. Id. at 1447 (majority opinion).  
 210. Id. The defendant in Betterman also suggested a reduction in sentence equivalent to the 
delay, but he did not receive such relief. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 n.6 (2016).  
 211. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1447 (“In Burkett I, however, the state court continued to 
violate the federal court order that petitioner be sentenced . . . . Here, the relief is more difficult to 
fashion.”). 
 212. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (suspending the 
remainder of Ray’s sentence in light of a sixteen-year delay and her substantial rehabilitation).  
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found that vacating the remainder of Ray’s sentence was proper213 
because a custodial sentence imposed fifteen years late would threaten 
her successful rehabilitation.214 The court recognized, however, that 
this circumstance was unusual and that “[t]he normal remedy for a due 
process violation is not discharge; rather, a court faced with a violation 
should attempt to counteract any resulting prejudice demonstrated by 
a petitioner.”215  
Lastly, some circuits have fashioned an appropriate sentence in 
an ad hoc fashion, with a discretionary reduction that does not 
necessarily correspond to the length of the delay.216 For example, the 
D.C. Circuit found that several months’ reduction in sentencing and a 
judicial apology were sufficient reparations for a thirty-three-month 
sentencing delay, during which time the defendant was confined to local 
jail.217  
In sum, a range of remedies may address undue delay, and 
courts have held that the context of the delay is relevant to the 
remedy.218 These examples help inform the relevant considerations in 
addressing claims of undue delay. 
III. AN UNEASY FIT: ORIENTING POSTCONVICTION DELAY  
WITHIN PRECONVICTION FRAMEWORKS 
After Betterman rejected the application of the Speedy Trial 
Clause to claims of delayed sentencing, courts have generally agreed 
that defendants’ constitutional due process rights may protect them 
from undue sentencing delay.219 The Supreme Court endorsed this 
 
 213. Ray was sentenced to one day in prison and three years of supervised relief. Id. at 189. 
She served one day in prison before bringing this appeal. Id. at 190.  
 214. Id. at 202–03.  
 215. Id. at 202 (quoting Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987)).  
 216. See United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 537–39 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding 
Yelverton’s remedy for undue delay in sentencing when he received a judicial apology and was 
intentionally sentenced in the middle of the guideline range rather than at the top).  
 217. Id. 
 218. See, e.g., Ray, 578 F.3d at 202–03 (suspending the remainder of Ray’s sentence because 
the delay was fifteen years and she had substantially rehabilitated herself); Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 
537–39 (upholding judicial apology and sentence in the middle of the sentencing guideline rather 
than at the top when sentencing delay could be attributed to the government but was not done in 
bad faith); Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1447 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a sentence reduction was 
appropriate but, unlike Burkett’s prior speedy sentencing claim, a sentence vacatur was not 
appropriate, since the lower court had willfully disregarded orders to sentence Burkett in the prior 
case).  
 219. See United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2018) (using Due Process 
Clause and Lovasco); United States v. Brown, 709 F. App’x 103, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2018) (using Due 
Process Clause and Lovasco); United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(using Due Process Clause and Barker); Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400 JLS (JMA), 2018 WL 
4405418, at *127 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (using Due Process Clause); United States v. Phillips, 
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approach in dicta.220 And lower courts’ application of due process 
analyses to alleged speedy sentencing violations, both before and after 
Betterman, demonstrates that due process is a workable analysis in the 
postconviction phase.221 A split remains, however, over the appropriate 
analysis to determine whether due process has been violated. An 
evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of Barker and Lovasco should 
consider the behavior that courts are attempting to deter and how the 
remedy effectuates that deterrence.  
A. Comparing Frameworks to Analyze Undue Delay 
Neither Barker nor Lovasco addressed undue delay in 
sentencing—Barker involved delay between arrest and trial, while 
Lovasco pertained to precharge delay.222 Nevertheless, each test has 
features that render it well suited for the sentencing context and 
reasons that it might not be appropriate.  
 
No. 1:15-CR-104, 2017 WL 3129135, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2017) (using Due Process Clause and 
Barker); Deck v. Steele, 249 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2017) (using Due Process Clause and 
Barker); United States v. Evans, No. 15-16 ADM/LIB, 2017 WL 1047254, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 
2017) (using Due Process Clause and Lovasco factors, though not by name); Neathery v. Rader, 
No. 13-658-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 30, 2016) (using Due Process Clause 
and Lovasco-type analysis); United States v. Lymon, No. 15-CR-4082MCA, 2016 WL 9488764, at 
*3 (D.N.M. Dec. 9, 2016) (using Due Process Clause); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 
WL 3519550, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (using Due Process Clause and Barker); Figueroa v. 
Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J. June 23, 2016) (using Due Process 
Clause); People v. Dalby, No. C078421, 2018 WL 316442, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018) 
(acknowledging that the Due Process Clause “arguably protect[s] against fundamental unfairness 
in sentencing”); People v. Wiseman, 413 P.3d 233, 241–42, 242 n.10 (Colo. App. 2017) (using Due 
Process Clause but rejecting Barker); State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (using 
Due Process Clause and Lovasco). But see Johnson v. Lester, No. CV-17-90-BU-BMM, 2018 WL 
934605, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 16, 2018) (holding there is no federal due process claim for 
unreasonable sentencing delay); Stevens v. McTighe, No. CV-18-01-BU-BMM, 2018 WL 747846, 
at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (same); Arnett v. Paramo, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL 
4325576, at *18–19 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (asserting that defendant has “no constitutional right 
to a speedy sentencing hearing” but analyzing the claim under state law limiting sentencing delay), 
adopted, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL 4325586 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (mem.); 
State v. D.S., No. 16-0693, 2017 WL 5509925, at *7–8 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that 
defendant has no right to a speedy sentencing hearing under Betterman but that sentencing should 
be imposed without unreasonable delay).  
 220. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016) (suggesting that a defendant could seek 
relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 221. See, e.g., Brown, 709 F. App’x at 103 (acknowledging Betterman’s dicta that sentencing 
delay could violate the Due Process Clause and citing Ray for the proposition that Lovasco should 
be used to analyze the due process claim); Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (rejecting the Speedy Trial Clause 
prior to Betterman and applying the Due Process Clause). 
 222. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789–94 (1977) (distinguishing precharge 
delay from the right to a speedy trial and defining the relevant interests to be considered); Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–22 (1972) (describing how the right to a speedy trial is different than 
all other rights and describing the interests at stake). 
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1. The Barker Factors 
In Betterman, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the Barker 
factors promote interests similar to those at stake at sentencing223—
Barker seeks to promote decency and fairness, ensure efficiency 
through prompt adjudication, protect the public from additional harm 
by criminals who are not confined during adjudication, and prevent any 
“detrimental effect on rehabilitation.”224 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg 
referenced all four Barker factors in a footnote as potentially “relevant 
considerations,” albeit without a citation to Barker.225 Although she did 
not endorse the test as explicitly as Justice Sotomayor did, some 
commentators have suggested that the majority’s reference all but 
confirms Barker’s application to a speedy sentencing Due Process 
Clause analysis.226 
Further, many courts have already applied Barker in the 
sentencing context,227 lending credence to its applicability. Although 
some courts applied Barker under a Speedy Trial Clause analysis, 
others have found that Barker is appropriate to analyze due process 
claims.228 As discussed in Section II.A.3, the Burkett court held that the 
Due Process Clause applies to postconviction delays and examined 
speedy trial and due process claims together under Barker.229 
Concededly, Burkett was explicitly concerned with due process rights 
affected by the delay in Burkett’s appeal, which was caused by his 
delayed sentence.230 Nevertheless, the concerns raised by delay in an 
appeal and sentencing are not so disparate—after all, one concern with 
sentencing delays is that they impede a defendant’s ability to appeal.231 
 
 223. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 224. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20.  
 225. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12 (“Relevant considerations may include the 
length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing, 
and prejudice.”). 
 226. See Little, supra note 166. 
 227. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
majority of circuits have applied Barker to speedy sentencing claims); see also cases cited supra 
note 105 (applying the Barker factors to speedy sentencing claims before Betterman, albeit under 
the Speedy Trial Clause); supra Section II.B.1 (describing cases applying the Barker factors to due 
process challenges to sentencing delay after Betterman).  
 228. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1991) (using the Barker factors to 
analyze undue delay in sentencing under the Speedy Trial Clause and the Due Process Clause). 
 229. Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221–22 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 230. See United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 
2016) (“[T]he Burkett I court was specifically addressing Fourteenth Amendment due process 
concerns resulting from unreasonable delays in the appellate process . . . .”).  
 231. See id. (stating that despite the slight factual difference, Burkett still demonstrates the 
applicability of the Barker factors to a speedy sentencing due process claim). 
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As such, cases like Burkett demonstrate that Barker may be a suitable 
framework for a due process speedy sentencing claim.  
Applying Barker to the sentencing context may, however, 
present some drawbacks. First, Barker’s factors are part of a balancing 
test, in which no single factor—length of delay, reason for delay, 
assertion of right, or prejudice to the defendant—functions as necessary 
or sufficient to finding a violation.232 Instead, a court must engage in a 
case-by-case review, considering each factor under the 
circumstances.233 In one sense, this lends itself well to sentencing delays 
by providing courts with flexibility to engage in circumstantial 
review.234 Courts that have applied Barker to sentencing, however, 
demonstrate that few claims succeed under its balancing test, as 
evidenced by those courts that have applied its factors to sentencing.235 
This poor success rate might suggest that the Barker balancing test 
does not provide a meaningful review of the harm that undue delay 
imposes on defendants. The Lovasco test, however, probably cannot 
resolve this problem either.236 
Second, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his Betterman 
concurrence, the Barker factors might not lend themselves well to 
claims of delayed sentencing.237 Barker’s factors were fashioned to 
address the unique concerns raised by trial delays,238 which are not 
always present in the sentencing context. For instance, the Barker 
Court noted that the defendant can use delay in the trial phase to his 
benefit.239 The defendant may be able to exploit court backlog to 
negotiate better pleas or delay in the hope that incriminating witnesses 
may become unavailable or forget important facts as time passes.240 
Additionally, society bears the cost of incarcerating a presumptively 
innocent individual—both directly, in paying to house the defendant in 
jail, and indirectly, as the defendant’s family may be forced to rely on 
welfare if its main wage earner remains in jail for an extended period 
 
 232. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).  
 233. Id.  
 234. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 508. 
 235. See WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 61, § 524 n.18 (collecting speedy sentencing cases 
that failed under Barker); see also United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(asserting that claims that fail under Barker would fail under any other test).  
 236. See infra notes 270–271 and accompanying text.  
 237. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 238. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519, 530–33 (explaining that the speedy trial right is different 
than other constitutional rights and describing the rationale behind the four Barker factors).  
 239. Id. at 519 (noting that defendants can manipulate the system and that the delay might 
work to a defendant’s advantage).  
 240. Id. at 519–20.  
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of time.241 Conversely, defendants who are already convicted are unable 
to negotiate favorable plea deals. Furthermore, a sentencing proceeding 
is not an opportunity for the defendant to retry his conviction, and thus 
concerns about witness reliability are less relevant.242 And, perhaps 
most important to the Betterman Court, the defendant is no longer 
presumed innocent during sentencing.243 Accordingly, while it is true 
that society still must bear the expense of the defendant’s incarceration 
and any attendant costs, these expenses would burden society 
regardless of the speed with which a defendant is sentenced.244  
Some of Barker’s other concerns about a speedy trial, however, 
are relevant in the sentencing context. Barker points out that a 
defendant who is released on bail while awaiting trial may commit 
additional crimes.245 This same concern applies if a defendant is out on 
bail pending his sentencing. Additionally, recall that Barker was 
particularly concerned with prejudice: the Court sought to protect the 
defendant from oppressive incarceration, minimize the defendant’s 
anxiety, and ensure the defendant’s case is not impaired.246 Barker 
emphasized that prejudice due to impairment of the defendant’s case is 
the most pressing concern because the ability of a defendant to put on 
a complete and accurate defense is key to maintaining a fair criminal 
system.247 Admittedly, impairment is not as pertinent of a concern to a 
defendant who is already convicted.248 Defendants at the sentencing 
phase have already presented their defenses and been found guilty; 
thus, delay cannot impair their defenses. Sentencing may, however, 
involve additional factfinding to determine an appropriate sentence, 
 
 241. See id. (listing the various interests affected by delay).  
 242. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) (explaining that defendants’ rights to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses at sentencing is limited). Of course, as explained below, if a defendant 
successfully appeals a conviction, witness reliability would become relevant, and any delay in 
sentencing would contribute to a delay in ultimately retrying the case. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d 
1431, 1445–46 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting delay would be relevant to an appeal and subsequent new 
trial).  
 243. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2016) (holding that presumption of innocence 
does not extend to sentencing and noting that the question of guilt is not addressed at sentencing, 
as it has already been established).  
 244. In egregious circumstances, the delay in sentencing could exceed the time that a 
defendant is ultimately sentenced to serve in prison. In such cases, society would actually be 
burdened by the sentencing delay, because the defendant was incarcerated longer than necessary. 
I have not come across such an example, however, and accordingly deduce that this would be a 
rare occurrence, if it happens at all.  
 245. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.  
 246. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 501.  
 247. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (unequivocally stating that impairment of the defense is the 
“most serious” concern).  
 248. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Supreme Court stated that the 
Barker v. Wingo factors assume a different (presumably lesser) stature where the defendant is 
incarcerated after conviction . . . .” (citing Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973))).  
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and delay may hinder the defendant’s ability to represent these facts 
correctly. The Burkett court also pointed out that delayed sentencing 
could impair a defendant’s ability to reconstruct his defense if 
successful on appeal.249 Moreover, the Supreme Court has cautioned 
courts not to overlook the defendant’s interest in parole and meaningful 
rehabilitation, which suggests that Barker’s concerns about oppressive 
incarceration and the defendant’s anxiety relate to sentencing as 
well.250  
2. The Lovasco Test 
The Lovasco test was intended to analyze Due Process Clause 
violations regarding undue delay at the precharge stage, not 
postconviction.251 Thus, like Barker, the Lovasco test traditionally 
applies when the defendant is presumed innocent, a presumption that 
does not exist at sentencing.252 Addressing this distinction, the 
Betterman Court asserted that defendants’ due process rights diminish 
after conviction in light of their presumed guilt, but those rights are 
still present nonetheless.253 The Court confirmed, however, that 
defendants are entitled to sentencing that is “fundamentally fair.”254  
Lovasco also focuses on societal concepts of fairness and 
decency.255 It asks the court to determine “whether the action 
complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice 
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,’ and which 
define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ”256 Courts have 
interpreted the two prongs of Lovasco to require defendants show both 
(1) prejudice to the defendant and (2) bad faith on the government’s 
 
 249. See id. at 1445–46 (reporting Burkett’s concern that delay in his sentencing created 
uncertainty in when his appeal would be decided and damaged his ability to reconstruct his 
defense).  
 250. Moore, 414 U.S. at 27.  
 251. Little, supra note 166.  
 252. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784 (1977) (describing the precharge delay at 
issue); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Betterman v. Montana and the Underenforcement of Constitutional 
Rights at Sentencing, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 325 (2016) (“After all, trials exist to determine 
guilt or innocence. . . . In contrast, guilt is a forgone conclusion at sentencing . . . .”). 
 253. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2016). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (asserting Lovasco is well 
suited to analyze whether sentencing delay violates due process rights).  
 256. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (citation omitted) (first quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 
103, 112 (1935); and then quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)). 
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behalf.257 The defendant thus carries the heavy burden of establishing 
two essential elements, neither of which is particularly easy to prove.258  
As such, Lovasco offers courts less flexibility in their analyses 
than Barker does, and it may impose an overly robust hurdle for 
defendants alleging sentencing delay. It also fails to explicitly address 
the length of the delay, perhaps suggesting it is ill equipped to handle 
complaints by defendants awaiting the final disposition of their cases.259 
Of course, the length of the delay factors into the prejudice prong, but 
Lovasco does not place as much emphasis on length of time as Barker 
does.260 But unlike Barker, Lovasco was actually designed to analyze 
due process claims,261 which is the generally accepted constitutional 
challenge to delayed sentencing now that Betterman rejected a Speedy 
Trial Clause challenge.262 And Lovasco has a stated interest in 
fundamental fairness, a concept emphasized by Betterman.263 
Nevertheless, Barker is not entirely devoid of this principle, asserting a 
“general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent 
and fair procedures.”264 
Another problem with Lovasco is that the behavior it seeks to 
deter is not entirely consistent with the sentencing context. Lovasco 
was specifically concerned with balancing the discretion of the 
prosecutor and the efficacy of filing charges against the prejudice to the 
accused.265 The Court sought to ensure that prosecutors had the 
discretion to file charges only when they believed they had probable 
cause and the ability to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.266 It 
balanced this against the fact that delay might necessarily prejudice 
the defendant—for example, by impairing his defense.267 Under 
 
 257. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant’s 
claim failed Lovasco, as he did not provide affirmative evidence of bad faith). 
 258. See id. at 580–81 (describing defendant’s heavy burdens to show (1) he suffered prejudice 
due to a fundamentally unfair process and (2) the government purposefully caused the delay). 
 259. Notwithstanding the extreme impact of the length of time on the defendant, there is also 
the possibility that the sentence could be shorter than the delay. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 502.  
 260. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789–90 (“Actual prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may 
result from the shortest and most necessary delay . . . .”).  
 261. See State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (attesting to the suitability of 
Lovasco’s due process framework to examine sentencing delay). 
 262. See cases cited supra notes 168–169 (collecting post-Betterman cases addressing 
constitutional challenges to delayed sentencing).  
 263. See Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233 (pointing to Lovasco’s consideration of fair play and decency).  
 264. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).  
 265. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790–94 (describing the rationale and benefits of the prosecution’s 
decision to bring charges at various points and the effect on defendant).  
 266. See id.  
 267. See id. at 785–86, 796 (holding that although defendant may have been “somewhat 
prejudiced” by delay that caused him to lose a potentially material witness, that determination did 
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Lovasco, some prejudice is not enough to establish a due process 
violation without a showing of bad faith by the prosecutor.268 This 
careful balance between ensuring evidentiary sufficiency and deterring 
illegitimate precharge delay is not applicable to sentencing. The 
prosecutor has long since decided to bring charges at the point that the 
defendant awaits sentencing, so questions of probable cause and 
reasonable doubt are moot. And, as discussed in Section III.A.1, the 
threat to the accuracy of a defendant’s case is generally not as 
pronounced at sentencing as it is in preparing for trial.269 Lastly, some 
commentators have noted that the speedy trial right is a more concrete 
and robust right than the due process right.270 Thus, applying the 
traditional due process framework of Lovasco might provide less 
protection than Barker, which is traditionally designed to serve Speedy 
Trial Clause claims.271  
B. Analyzing Remedies for Speedy Sentencing Violations 
Part of the Betterman Court’s resistance to a Sixth Amendment 
analysis was the remedy—violation of the Speedy Trial Clause 
mandates dismissal of the case against the defendant.272 But Betterman 
did not seek that remedy: he requested a reduction of his sentence.273 
One scholar has questioned why the Betterman Court could not have 
simply fashioned a new remedy to suit the particular harm Betterman 
suffered.274 Another commentator has suggested that the Court 
deliberately avoided the possibility that the charges could be dismissed 
without prejudice and subsequently refiled, such that dismissal would 
not have been the “unjustified windfall” that Justice Ginsburg 
apparently feared.275 Of course, dismissal without prejudice might 
 
not justify finding a violation when the investigation by the government had been undertaken in 
good faith).  
 268. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (declining to find a due 
process violation under Lovasco when the defendant failed to affirmatively show bad faith by the 
government).  
 269. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Hessick, supra note 252, at 334 (stating that the Due Process Clause right at 
sentencing is likely to be more case specific and more difficult to enforce than a bright-line rule 
like the speedy trial right). 
 271. See id. (“It is unclear whether defendants will fare as well under the Due Process Clause 
as they might have had the Court gone the other way in Betterman.”).  
 272. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016). 
 273. Hessick, supra note 252, at 331 (citing Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 n.6).  
 274. See id. at 330–31 (“It is unclear why the Court’s past practice in speedy trial cases must 
govern all future cases. Courts often use their inherent power to fashion remedies to address the 
precise nature of harm suffered in a particular case.”). 
 275. Little, supra note 166.  
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defeat the interest in judicial efficiency described in Barker,276 but it 
would render dismissal of charges a less extreme remedy. Finally, some 
courts have considered a sentence vacatur an appropriate remedy in the 
due process context as well, the value of which is worth addressing in 
particularly egregious circumstances, like in Ray.277  
Traditionally, the only remedy available under Barker is 
dismissal of the defendant’s charges.278 The Betterman Court rejected 
this particular bright-line approach to remedying sentencing delays.279 
It is curious, then, why both the Betterman majority (implicitly) and 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence (explicitly) proposed using the Barker 
factors to analyze a claim of undue delay under the Due Process 
Clause280 rather than using the more traditional Lovasco due process 
framework. Perhaps this suggests that although the Court rejects a rule 
that mandates dismissal of charges, it generally supports a more 
consistent, bright-line approach than the more amorphous Lovasco 
remedy281—that is, to simply fashion a remedy to counteract the 
amount of prejudice suffered by the defendant.282 Adopting this sort of 
case-by-case analysis would allow courts to individualize remedies, but 
it would also lead to inconsistency.283 
One suggestion is to implement a bright-line rule where, in the 
case of undue delay, a court automatically imposes the minimum 
sentence to which the conviction exposes the defendant.284 This 
approach could be problematic for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, 
judges might seek to protect their discretion and, as a workaround, 
decline to find delay in the first place. On the other hand, even if a 
minimum-sentence remedy was imposed, it fails to address the 
individual circumstances of each defendant and each case. As a result, 
this remedy might seem either excessive or insufficient relative to the 
harm caused by delay. Additionally, a minimum-sentence rule would 
not provide an adequate remedy for cases where the delay exceeds the 
minimum. Damages might be one way to supplement this approach in 
 
 276. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
 277. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (essentially vacating the 
defendant’s sentence after she served one day in prison but still had three years of supervised time 
and six months in a halfway house yet to be served).  
 278. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) (holding that for a Speedy Trial Clause 
violation, “dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, ‘the only possible remedy’ ” (quoting Barker, 
407 U.S. at 522)). 
 279. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016). 
 280. Id. at 1618 n.12; id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 281. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 494–95 (noting Lovasco’s strong emphasis on prejudice 
and fairness and the vague instruction in forming a remedy to fit the prejudice). 
 282. Id. at 495 (quoting Ray, 578 F.3d at 202).  
 283. Id. at 508. 
 284. Id. at 504.  
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such circumstances, but it is unlikely that defendants would consider 
money an adequate remedy for unjust incarceration.285  
Taking a different tack, Justice Thomas recommended that 
defendants could petition for a writ of mandamus,286 a command from 
the reviewing court to compel certain action by the lower court or 
government actor.287 A writ pertaining to delayed sentencing typically 
compels the trial court to set a prompt sentencing hearing when there 
has been extreme delay.288 Unfortunately, this remedy fails to account 
for the harm already suffered by the defendant or address situations 
where the delay exceeds any possible sentence. 
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL: APPLYING BARKER TO SPEEDY  
SENTENCING CLAIMS 
This Note proposes that speedy sentencing claims be analyzed 
under the Due Process Clause and that courts apply the Barker 
balancing test to determine whether there has been undue delay. A 
more flexible remedy, however, is called for—something more akin to 
the flexible relief under Lovasco than the automatic dismissal 
mandated by Barker.289 The default remedy for finding a violation 
should be to reduce the defendant’s sentence in an amount equal to the 
delay. This default, however, can be overcome by a clear showing that 
the interests of justice would not be served by the default remedy, in 
which case a court could fashion appropriate relief in a more free-form 
fashion.  
 
 285. Id. at 502–03. Damages cannot negate the psychological damage of incarceration or the 
hurdles of reentering society. Cf. Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of 
Wrongful Conviction, CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2010, at 10, 10 (discussing exonerees’ struggles with 
the stigma of conviction, struggles to find work, difficulties reentering family life and society 
generally, and resulting mental-health issues). Even if awarded, the appropriate amount of 
damages is challenging to determine and may be considered monetarily insufficient to compensate 
for the harm suffered. Cf. Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 245, 
259 (2017) (comparing the difficulty of awarding damages to exonerees to the challenges of 
damages in wrongful death suits). 
 286. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 287. Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 288. See United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that Yelverton 
failed to “seek mandamus from this court to compel the district court to impose [his] sentence”).  
 289. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (explaining that finding a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Clause leads to the severe remedy of dismissal of the charge). 
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A. An Argument for Applying the Barker Factors to  
Claims of Undue Delay 
The Supreme Court has recommended, albeit in dicta, that 
courts employ the Barker factors to postconviction claims of delay.290 
Many courts previously employed Barker to analyze speedy sentencing 
claims under the Speedy Trial Clause,291 and following Betterman, some 
courts have applied Barker to speedy sentencing claims under the Due 
Process Clause.292 Advocates would be wise to heed the Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in this regard, as it presents the best indication of the 
Court’s approach to finding a constitutional speedy sentencing right. 
After all, the Justices presumably refrained from explicitly endorsing a 
due process analysis only because Betterman presented solely a Sixth 
Amendment Speedy Trial Clause question.293 And as one scholar 
pointed out, it would not be outlandish for defendants to successfully 
assert a constitutional right at sentencing under the Due Process 
Clause—courts have previously found other sentencing rights under 
that clause, such as the right to be sentenced without consideration of 
race.294 
As the Third Circuit has demonstrated, Barker’s four factors—
length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, 
and prejudice to the defendant—could easily be adapted to 
sentencing.295 As a flexible balancing test, Barker allows for an ad hoc 
consideration of each factor.296 No one factor is considered necessary or 
sufficient to find a violation of a defendant’s right, and each factor is 
considered under the circumstances of the case.297 For example, in 
James, the delay was quite long (fourteen months), which weighed 
against the government; but the reason for delay was largely 
attributable to the defendants, who did not demand sentencing and 
 
 290. See supra notes 160–166 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The majority of the 
Circuits in fact use the Barker test for that purpose.”); Saetveit, supra note 100, at 491–92 
(collecting cases applying Barker to speedy sentencing claims).  
 292. See cases cited supra notes 168–169.  
 293. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1612 (“Brandon Betterman, however, advanced in this 
Court only a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. He did not preserve a due process challenge. 
We, therefore, confine this opinion to his Sixth Amendment challenge.” (citation omitted)).  
 294. See Hessick, supra note 252, at 334 (explaining that finding constitutional rights at 
sentencing under the Due Process Clause is “hardly new” and providing the example of courts that 
reversed sentences based on race as violative of due process rather than equal protection).  
 295. See United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2017) (employing the 
Barker factors to analyze a due process speedy sentencing claim).  
 296. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30, 533 (1972) (rejecting an inflexible approach 
and endorsing a balancing test that considers the circumstances of the case). 
 297. Id. at 533.  
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largely benefitted from the delay.298 Barker also allows different weight 
to be given to factors depending on the circumstances—for example, 
more neutral reasons for delay, such as backlogged courts, still weigh 
slightly against the government, but not as much as an intentional, 
tactical delay.299 Indeed, in James, the government caused some delay 
in responding to discovery requested by one of the defendants—the 
court noted that this weighed slightly against the government, but not 
as heavily as deliberately impeding the process.300  
Such careful balancing incentivizes the government to be 
proactive in seeking prompt sentencing without punishing the 
government whenever some delay arises. James exemplifies a case with 
various reasons for delay: a complex restitution calculation, the 
preparation of a presentence report based on those calculations, a 
defendant’s discovery requests, and the judge’s illness all delayed the 
sentencing hearing.301 Although the defendants made some valid claims 
of prejudice, a number of considerations cut against their case: they did 
not assert their rights for nearly the entirety of the delay; they 
personally benefitted from a reduction in restitution due to revised 
calculations; and the length of time was not unreasonable, considering 
the preparation required.302 James thus demonstrates another benefit 
of applying Barker in this context—it incentivizes defendants to assert 
their rights instead of trying to manipulate the system by prolonging 
their own sentencing and then complaining of delay, since their 
assertion of a right to prompt sentencing is a factor.303 In light of Cain304 
and Lopez,305 it is clear that this Barker factor is important to 
postconviction delays: even though these cases purportedly applied the 
Lovasco test, both courts looked to the defendant’s assertion of right, a 
 
 298. See 712 F. App’x at 162–63 (going through the four Barker factors and finding that the 
defendants’ rights were not violated).  
 299. See 407 U.S. at 531 (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as 
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 300. See 712 F. App’x at 162 (contrasting deliberate delay with a good faith effort to respond 
to discovery).  
 301. See id. at 162–63 (employing the Barker factors to analyze a due process claim regarding 
sentencing delay and finding no violation). 
 302. See id. (holding that the defendants’ rights were not violated even though they 
experienced some prejudice, as that minimal showing alone was not dispositive).  
 303. See id. (explaining that the defendants did not assert their rights until one month before 
the sentencing hearing, after a full year of them not complaining and in fact seeking delay 
themselves).  
 304. United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2018).  
 305. State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017). 
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traditional Barker factor, in concluding that there was no speedy 
sentencing violation.306  
The flexibility of the Barker factors can be contrasted with the 
rigidity of Lovasco’s two-prong test. Under Lovasco, both the improper 
reason and prejudice prongs are necessary to finding undue delay—
even if a defendant demonstrates “actual and substantial prejudice,” 
relief will not be granted if there was a “legitimate reason for the 
delay.”307 Lovasco essentially requires bad faith on the government’s 
behalf.308 This could be particularly troubling in cases with long 
institutional delays, such as those caused by understaffed courts. For 
example, consider a case in a small rural town with a defendant who 
cannot make bail and sits in jail, awaiting sentencing for a low-level 
crime. He might wait an inordinately long time if a judge falls ill, 
emergency cases arise, or the staff member conducting his presentence 
report unexpectedly quits. Even if the defendant makes frequent 
requests for sentencing and shows he suffered an inability to participate 
in substance-abuse counseling, his claim might fail under Lovasco. 
Although he might have suffered prejudice, there are legitimate reasons 
for delay.309 Courts have distinguished such institutional delays from 
those that are “purposeful or oppressive.”310 Institutional delay, if 
particularly egregious, is still not “acceptable,” but courts applying 
Lovasco seem to counteract “unacceptable” yet unintentional delay by 
finding that the defendant failed to prove prejudice.311  
Lovasco’s requirement for actual, demonstrable prejudice sets it 
apart from Barker and makes it a poor fit for the sentencing context. 
Cases adhering to Lovasco often find that the defendant’s alleged 
prejudice is too “speculative,” particularly when the prejudice the 
defendant alleges is ineligibility for release or lack of access to 
 
 306. See Cain, 734 F. App’x at 25–26 (describing Cain’s multiple pro se requests for 
resentencing); Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233–34 (explaining that the defendant actually requested more 
time to get his affairs in order prior to sentencing and did not make any effort to seek his 
presentence report).  
 307. Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 979 (Mont. 2015) (quoting United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 
234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988)).  
 308. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s 
due process claim when he failed to affirmatively show bad faith by the government). 
 309. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 979 (interpreting Lovasco to require both improper reasons 
for delay and prejudice for due process claims). 
 310. See, e.g., id. at 981.  
 311. See Cain, 734 F. App’x at 25–26 (denying the defendant’s claims because the prejudice he 
alleged was too speculative but noting that the government and district court bore responsibility 
for their negligence in scheduling sentencing); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (concluding that 
fourteen months of institutional delay was “unacceptable” but that Betterman’s prejudice was 
neither substantial nor demonstrable when he complained of an inability to access rehabilitation 
services and ineligibility for conditional discharge).  
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rehabilitative services that local jails do not offer.312 This outcome is 
problematic, as claims of this nature go to the very heart of why delayed 
sentencing is troubling in the first place: sitting in local jail inhibits 
defendants’ ability to rehabilitate and reenter society.313 In contrast, 
cases relying on Barker have recognized the following as legitimate 
claims of prejudice: future participation in rehabilitative programs, 
eligibility for expanded visitation rights, and potentially missed 
opportunities like concurrent sentences.314 The Barker Court also 
explicitly recognized county jails as “deplorable” places, stating that 
time spent there was effectively “dead time.”315 Finally, the Barker 
Court was cognizant of the fact that defendants might not always be 
able to affirmatively demonstrate what they have lost through delay—
for example, Barker recognizes that witnesses’ memories may fade, but 
this is “not always reflected in the record because what has been 
forgotten can rarely be shown.”316 In the sentencing context, it would be 
similarly difficult for defendants to prove that they would be eligible for 
release or could have rehabilitated more but for being kept in local jails 
without access to those opportunities—it is impossible to show the 
benefit of something that was unavailable in the first place. Barker and 
Lovasco may seem relatively similar, but in practice, Lovasco would 
likely make it unnecessarily difficult for defendants to succeed on 
speedy sentencing claims.317 
 
 312. See, e.g., Cain, 734 F. App’x at 26 (finding alleged prejudice too speculative when 
defendant asserted he could have been released sooner if sentencing was not delayed); Betterman 
I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (rejecting Betterman’s due process claim as “speculative” and concluding 
that Betterman’s prejudice was “not substantial and demonstrable” when he claimed an inability 
to access rehabilitative services available at the Department of Corrections); see also United States 
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325–26 (1971) (explaining that the defendants did not demonstrate actual 
prejudice and the due process claims are thus “speculative and premature”).  
 313. See supra Section I.B.  
 314. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1443 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding merit in Burkett’s reported 
prejudice and “credit[ing] Burkett’s assertions that access to rehabilitative programs and the 
opportunity for more liberal visitation privileges are an appealing and legitimately valid 
alternative to the limbo he experienced in the county system”); Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1223–24 
(3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that Burkett suffered prejudice from potentially losing part of an 
opportunity for concurrent sentencing).  
 315. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520, 532–33 (1972).  
 316. Id. at 532.  
 317. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 18.5(b) (“It can certainly be argued that the Lovasco 
rule is too demanding.”); see also id.:  
Some lower courts have read Lovasco to mean that once the defendant proves prejudice, 
then “the burden shifts” to the prosecution to show a valid reason for the delay. This is 
a sensible allocation of the burden, for the reasons underlying the delay are peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the prosecution. Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that the 
defendant must shoulder this burden as well. It is not an easy burden to meet, especially 
because there is no discernible inclination of the lower courts to treat anything except 
an intent to hamper the defense as an improper reason. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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B. Applying Default Remedies with Ad Hoc Remedies  
Available as a Backstop 
While Barker’s factors are well suited to the postconviction 
setting, its bright-line remedy requiring dismissal of charges is not.318 
Instead, a finding of undue postconviction delay should warrant default 
remedies. Lovasco’s more amorphous remedial approach, however, 
should be available in circumstances where default remedies cannot, or 
should not, be applied under the particular facts of the case.  
If a court finds undue delay under the Barker factors, the default 
remedy should be a reduction in the sentence by the amount of undue 
delay.319 This reduction should be distinguished from the credit granted 
for time served, which is the routine procedure of counting the time the 
defendant serves while awaiting sentencing toward satisfaction of the 
sentence ultimately prescribed.320 State and federal statutes typically 
provide for this process.321 To illustrate this Note’s proposal, consider a 
defendant who was sentenced to thirty years but was subjected to an 
undue two-year delay while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing. The 
judge would reduce the defendant’s sentence to twenty-eight years as a 
remedy for the undue delay. Under existing sentencing procedures, the 
defendant would generally receive time-served credit as well, such that 
the two years spent incarcerated would be counted toward satisfying 
his reduced sentence of twenty-eight years. Accordingly, this defendant 
would still need to serve twenty-six years after his sentencing hearing.  
If such a default remedy is impossible to effectuate under the 
circumstances or would clearly not serve the interests of justice, the 
court would be permitted to fashion a flexible remedy under Lovasco’s 
ad hoc approach to appropriately address the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant.322 For example, if the amount of delay exceeds the sentence, 
it would be impossible to reduce the sentence by the amount of delay, 
and the defendant would not be properly recompensed. Consider a 
defendant sentenced to six months of incarceration after an undue two-
 
 318. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016) (referring to dismissal of a charge for 
postconviction delay as an “unjustified windfall”).  
 319. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1447 (using a sentence reduction as a remedy). 
 320. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617 n.9 (“Because postconviction incarceration is 
considered punishment for the offense, however, a defendant will ordinarily earn time-served 
credit for any period of presentencing detention.”).  
 321. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2012) (describing how defendants should be given credit for time 
“spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences”); Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 
1617 n.9 (“[State c]rediting statutes routinely provide that any period of time during which a 
person was incarcerated in relation to a given offense be counted toward satisfaction of any 
resulting sentence.” (alteration in original) (quoting ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 
§ 9:28, at 444–45 & n.4 (3d ed. 2004))).  
 322. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 (describing the remedy for a due process violation).  
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year delay in jail awaiting sentencing. Under this Note’s proposal, his 
sentence should be reduced by two years (the amount of time caused by 
undue delay), but this is impossible—the defendant cannot serve a 
negative one-and-a-half-year sentence. In practice, the defendant would 
typically be released right away because the time-served credit for the 
defendant’s two-year incarceration surpasses his six-month sentence.323 
In other words, the defendant’s sentence has already been served. Even 
so, the defendant in this situation has not been recompensed for the 
undue delay he suffered, because he cannot regain the time he lost in 
jail. Additionally, there might be a circumstance in which the delay in 
sentencing is very lengthy and would thus warrant a significant 
sentence reduction. But suppose the defendant is out on bail during the 
delay and commits another serious crime while sentencing is pending. 
Justice would not be served by rewarding such an individual with a 
substantially reduced sentence.  
In sum, both Barker and Lovasco contribute important 
rationales to the treatment of postconviction delay—while Barker’s 
factors are better suited for analyzing sentencing delay, Lovasco’s ad 
hoc approach to relief may inform an appropriate remedy for undue 
postconviction delay.  
CONCLUSION 
It is true that by the time defendants have reached the 
sentencing phase of their criminal proceedings, they are no longer 
presumed innocent.324 Nevertheless, as Betterman acknowledges, 
defendants still retain a right to fundamentally fair sentencing 
proceedings.325 As such, the criminal justice system, and society 
generally, should be concerned with any oppressive delays.326 By 
holding that the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to sentencing, the 
Betterman Court rejected the possibility that courts could automatically 
remedy sentencing delays by dismissing cases outright.327 It did not, 
 
 323. See supra note 321 (providing the federal and state statutory bases for routinely applying 
time-served credit). 
 324. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613–14, 1617 (dividing criminal proceedings into three 
stages—prearrest, arrest to conviction, and postconviction—and noting that the presumption of 
innocence detaches after conviction). 
 325. Id. at 1617.  
 326. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the Due Process 
Clause prohibits oppressive delay).  
 327. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 (“The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial 
right—dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause. It would be an 
unjustified windfall, in most cases, to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained 
convictions.” (citations omitted)). 
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however, foreclose the prospect that the same factors applied to Speedy 
Trial Clause violations could be used to analyze due process violations 
in the sentencing context.328 This Note proposes applying the Barker 
factors to claims of unduly delayed sentencing but allowing for a more 
suitable remedy. This solution acknowledges that sentencing delays 
implicate many of the same concerns as delaying a defendant’s trial 
while also recognizing that a defendant’s interests, though present, are 
not as acute as they are at the trial stage. Thus, it bridges the gap 
between the unsatisfactory remedy of dismissal that Speedy Trial 
Clause claims demand329 and affording a defendant protection of a due 
process right to prompt sentencing.  
 
Sarah R. Grimsdale* 
 
 
 328. Indeed, Betterman endorsed this proposal. See id. at 1618 n.12 (implicitly endorsing the 
Barker factors); id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explicitly endorsing the Barker factors).  
 329. Betterman, of course, explicitly rejected dismissal in the speedy sentencing context. Id. at 
1612 (majority opinion). 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., 2012, University of 
Colorado Boulder. I would like to thank my husband, Preston, for his never-ending support, 
encouragement, and coffee provision. I must also thank our little dog, Leo, for being the best office 
mate throughout this process, even though he will never be able to read this Note. Finally, thank 
you to my Vanderbilt Law Review peers who so carefully cite checked and edited this Note—it has 
been a pleasure collaborating with you all.  
